Empty ideas : a critique of analytic philosophy / Peter Unger

Author:: Unger, Peter K.
Published:: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2014]
Physical Description:: xiv, 258 pages ; 25 cm

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Contents:

Machine generated contents note: 1.How Empty Is Mainstream Philosophy? -- 1.Most Recent Mainstream Proposals Are Concretely Empty Ideas -- 2.A Working Idea of Concrete Reality -- 3.Observing the Concretely Empty in Some Recent Mainstream Philosophy -- 4.Our Central Distinction and Three That Have Been Philosophically Salient -- 5.The Concretely Empty, the Analytically Empty and Mainstream Philosophy -- 2.Promising Examples Of Concretely Substantial Philosophy -- 1.Some Pretty Promising Examples of Concretely Substantial Philosophy -- 2.The Substantial Scientiphicalism of Mainstream Philosophy -- 3.Memory, History and Emptiness -- 4.Various Specifications o/"Scientiphicalism and Various Departures from Scientiphicalism -- 5.Interactionist Entity Dualism and the Problem of Causal Pairings -- 6.Exploring Philosophical Thoughts that May Be Analytically Empty Ideas -- 3.Thinkers And What They Can Think About: Empty Issues And Individualistic Powers -- 1.Language, Thought and History -- 2.Thinking about "The External World" -- 3.Earth, Twin Earth and History -- 4.The Banality of Successfully Investigating Unfamiliar Individuals -- 5.A Concretely Substantial Possibility: Individualistically Directed Powers -- 6.The Propensity to Acquire Individualistic Powers and Its Historical Manifestation -- 7.A Concretely Substantial Possibility: Individualistically Directed Mental Powers -- 8.Generalistic Propensities to Acquire Real-kind Directed Mental Powers -- 9.Wishful Blindness to Emptiness: Putnam's "Transcendental" Pronouncement -- 10.Reading Modal Claims Substantially and Widening Our Philosophical Horizons -- 4.The Origins Of Material Individuals: Empty Issues And Sequentialistic Powers -- 1.The Origin of a Particular Wooden Table -- 2.Some Thoughts about Tables and Some Thoughts about Shmables -- 3.Origination Conditions, Persistence Conditions, and Boxing a Logical Compass -- 4.A Tenet of Scientiphicalism: Basic Individuals Have No "Memory-like" Propensity -- 5.How a Wooden Table Could Have First Been Made from a Hunk of Ice -- 6.Tood and Tice, a Table First Made of Wood and a Table First Made of Ice -- 7.Using Modal Terms Substantially: The Case of Determinism -- 8.Distinctive Material Objects and These Objects' Distinctive Matter -- 9.Sequentialistically Propensitied Concrete Particulars -- 10.Wooden Tables, Ice, and Sequentialistically Propensitied Concrete Particulars -- 5.The Persistence Of Material Individuals: Empty Issues And Self-Directed Propensity -- 1.Material Sculptures and Pieces of Matter -- 2.Are There Inconveniently Persisting Material Individuals? -- 3.Pieces, Lumps and Hunks: A Problematic Plethora of Persisting Individuals? -- 4.Is There a Plethora of Extraordinary Persisting Individuals? -- 5.Ordinary and Not So Ordinary Persisting Material Individuals -- 6.Using These Sentences Differently and Expressing Substantial Ideas -- 7.Fundamentals of Fundamental Material Persistents -- 6.Empty Debates About Material Matters -- 1.Matter Distributed Particulately, but Not Even a Single Material Individual? -- 2.Matter Distributed Particulately, but Only a Single Material Individual? -- 3.Matter and Material Objects: Salient Positions on Empty Questions -- 4.The Debate about Complex Material Individuals -- 5.An Exploration of the Salient Debate: Popular Paraphrases, Problematic Parallels -- 6.Complex Material Individuals and Arrangements of Simple Material Individuals -- 7.Mereological Sums of Simple Material Individuals: Fusions, Fusions Everywhere -- 8.Sums of Simple Physical Entities and Complex Ordinary Material Individuals -- 9.Four Distinct Sorts of Spatial Inhabitants: Material Mereological Sums, Material Arrangements, Complex Material Objects, and (Complex) Ordinary Individuals -- Worldy Appendix -- Are There Any Concrete Worlds, Including Even the Actual World? -- 7.Individuals, Properties And Time: A Few Substantial Thoughts And Many Empty Ideas -- 1.Are There Really Any Properties or Are There Only All the Propertied Individuals? -- 2.The Temporal, the Empty and the Substantial: First Part -- 3.The Temporal, the Empty and the Substantial: Second Part -- 4.Is There a Real Need That Properties (Alone) Suitably Serve? First Part -- 5.Is There a Real Need That Properties (Alone) Suitably Serve? Second Part -- 8.What Will Become Of Us: Empty Issues And Substantial Speculations -- 1.Locke's Proposed Persons -- 2.Locke's Lame Legacy -- 3.Beyond Locke, but Not beyond Philosophical Thoughts Both Incorrect and Empty -- 4.So-Called Commonsensical Materialism -- 5.So-Called Commonsensical Materialism and the Mental Problems of the Many -- 6.Might You Be a Quite Simple Physical Thing? If So, What Will Become of You? -- 7.Articulating Our Argument for a Substantial Dualist View of Ourselves -- 8.How an Immaterial Soul May, or May Not, Survive the Death of Its Body -- 9.If We Should Become Disembodied Souls, Will We Be Experiencing Souls? -- 10.If We Become Experiencing Disembodied Souls, Will We Be Fortunate Souls? -- 9.When Will There Be Some Serious New Substantial Philosophy? -- 1.Concretely Substantial Ideas about Mutually Isolated Concrete Worlds: First Part -- 2.Concretely Substantial Ideas about Mutually Isolated Concrete Worlds: Second Part -- 3.Some Substantial Philosophical Thoughts about Actual Concrete Reality -- 4.Scientific Philosophers and Serious New Substantial Philosophy -- 5.Philosophy May Mine and Refine What Even the Most Ambitious Sciences Produce -- 6.Concrete Reality and Modest Philosophy.

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ISBN:

9780199330812 (hardback : alk. paper)
0199330816 (hardback : alk. paper)

Bibliography Note:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 247-254) and index.

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