DSM shareholder incentives [electronic resource] : Current designs and economic theory
- Published
- Washington, D.C. : United States. Dept. of Energy, 1995.
Oak Ridge, Tenn. : Distributed by the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Dept. of Energy. - Physical Description
- 88 pages : digital, PDF file
- Additional Creators
- Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, United States. Department of Energy, and United States. Department of Energy. Office of Scientific and Technical Information
Access Online
- Restrictions on Access
- Free-to-read Unrestricted online access
- Summary
- This report reviews recent DSM shareholder incentive designs and performance at 10 US utilities identifies opportunities for regulators to improve the design of DSM shareholder incentive mechanisms to increase the procurement of cost-effective DSM resources. We develop six recommendations: (1) apply shared-savings incentives to DSM resource programs; (2) use markup incentives for individual programs only when net benefits are difficult to measure, but are known to be positive; (3) set expected incentive payments based on covering a utility`s {open_quotes}hidden costs,{close_quotes} which include some transitional management and risk-adjusted opportunity costs; (4) use higher marginal incentives rates than are currently found in practice, but limit total incentive payments by adding a fixed charge; (5) mitigate risks to regulators and utilities by lowering marginal incentive rates at high and low performance levels; and (6) use an aggregate incentive mechanism for all DSM resource programs, with limited exceptions (e.g., information programs where markups are more appropriate).
- Report Numbers
- E 1.99:lbl--36580
lbl--36580 - Subject(s)
- Other Subject(s)
- Note
- Published through SciTech Connect.
01/01/1995.
"lbl--36580"
"DE95008357"
Eto, J.; Stoft, S.; Kito, S. - Type of Report and Period Covered Note
- Topical; 01/01/1995 - 01/01/1995
- Funding Information
- AC03-76SF00098
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