Actions for Nuclear criticality safety bounding analysis for the in-tank-precipitation (ITP) process, impacted by fissile isotopic weight fractions [electronic resource].

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Nuclear criticality safety bounding analysis for the in-tank-precipitation (ITP) process, impacted by fissile isotopic weight fractions [electronic resource].

Published
Washington, D.C. : United States. Dept. of Energy, 1994.
Oak Ridge, Tenn. : Distributed by the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Dept. of Energy.
Physical Description
134 pages : digital, PDF file
Additional Creators
Westinghouse Savannah River Company, United States. Department of Energy, and United States. Department of Energy. Office of Scientific and Technical Information
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Summary
The In-Tank Precipitation process (ITP) receives High Level Waste (HLW) supernatant liquid containing radionuclides in waste processing tank 48H. Sodium tetraphenylborate, NaTPB, and monosodium titanate (MST), NaTi₂O₅H, are added for removal of radioactive Cs and Sr, respectively. In addition to removal of radio-strontium, MST will also remove plutonium and uranium. The majority of the feed solutions to ITP will come from the dissolution of supernate that had been concentrated by evaporation to a crystallized salt form, commonly referred to as saltcake. The concern for criticality safety arises from the adsorption of U and Pt onto MST. If sufficient mass and optimum conditions are achieved then criticality is credible. The concentration of u and Pt from solution into the smaller volume of precipitate represents a concern for criticality. This report supplements WSRC-TR-93-171, Nuclear Criticality Safety Bounding Analysis For The In-Tank-Precipitation (ITP) Process. Criticality safety in ITP can be analyzed by two bounding conditions: (1) the minimum safe ratio of MST to fissionable material and (2) the maximum fissionable material adsorption capacity of the MST. Calculations have provided the first bounding condition and experimental analysis has established the second. This report combines these conditions with canyon facility data to evaluate the potential for criticality in the ITP process due to the adsorption of the fissionable material from solution. In addition, this report analyzes the potential impact of increased U loading onto MST. Results of this analysis demonstrate a greater safety margin for ITP operations than the previous analysis. This report further demonstrates that the potential for criticality in the ITP process due to adsorption of fissionable material by MST is not credible.
Report Numbers
E 1.99:wsrc-tr--94-004
wsrc-tr--94-004
Subject(s)
Other Subject(s)
Note
Published through SciTech Connect.
04/22/1994.
"wsrc-tr--94-004"
"DE94014874"
Bess, C.E.
Type of Report and Period Covered Note
Topical; 04/01/1994 - 04/01/1994
Funding Information
AC09-89SR18035
View MARC record | catkey: 14115491