Actions for Evaluating and managing the integrity of computerized accountability systems against insider threats [electronic resource].

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Evaluating and managing the integrity of computerized accountability systems against insider threats [electronic resource].

Published
Washington, D.C. : United States. Dept. of Energy, 1996.
Oak Ridge, Tenn. : Distributed by the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Dept. of Energy.
Physical Description
10 pages : digital, PDF file
Additional Creators
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, United States. Department of Energy, and United States. Department of Energy. Office of Scientific and Technical Information
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Summary
Accountability applications such as nuclear material accountability systems at Department of Energy (DOE) facilities provide for tracking inventories, documenting transactions, issuing periodic reports, and assisting in the detection of unauthorized system access and data falsification. Insider threats against the system represent the potential to degrade the integrity with which these functions are addressed. While preventing unauthorized access by external threats is vital, it is also critical to understand how application features affect the ability of insiders to impact the integrity of data in the system. Aspects of modern computing systems including powerful personal computers and applications on networks, mixed security environments, and more users with increased software knowledge and skills help heighten the concern about insider threats. A question arises as follows. How can managers and policy makers logically and pragmatically analyze the myriad customization and design options for accountability applications with respect to the insider threat. In this paper, we describe a methodology for addressing this question, along with insights from its application to local area network (LAN) material accountability systems.
Report Numbers
E 1.99:ucrl-jc--124361
E 1.99: conf-9606221--8
conf-9606221--8
ucrl-jc--124361
Subject(s)
Other Subject(s)
Note
Published through SciTech Connect.
06/01/1996.
"ucrl-jc--124361"
" conf-9606221--8"
"DE96050335"
12. annual security technology symposium, Williamsburg, VA (United States), 17-20 Jun 1996.
Jones, E.; Sicherman, A.
Funding Information
W-7405-ENG-48
View MARC record | catkey: 14355526