Actions for Risk management for operations of the Los Alamos critical experiments facility [electronic resource].

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Risk management for operations of the Los Alamos critical experiments facility [electronic resource].

Published
Washington, D.C. : United States. Dept. of Energy, 1998.
Oak Ridge, Tenn. : Distributed by the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Dept. of Energy.
Physical Description
5 pages : digital, PDF file
Additional Creators
Los Alamos National Laboratory, United States. Department of Energy, and United States. Department of Energy. Office of Scientific and Technical Information
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Summary
The Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility (LACEF) currently operates two burst reactors (Godiva-IV and Skua), one solution assembly (SHEBA 2--Solution high-Energy Burst Assembly), two fast-spectrum benchmark assemblies (Flattop and Big Ten), and five general-purpose remote assembly machines which may be configured with nuclear materials and assembled by remote control. SNM storage vaults support these and other operations at the site. With this diverse set of operations, several approaches are possible in the analysis and management of risk. The most conservative approach would be to write a safety analysis report (SAR) for each assembly and experiment. A more cost-effective approach is to analyze the probability and consequences of several classes of operations representative of operations on each critical assembly machine and envelope the bounding case accidents. Although the neutron physics of these machines varies widely, the operations performed at LACEF fall into four operational modes: steady-state mode, approach-to-critical mode, prompt burst mode, and nuclear material operations which can include critical assembly fuel loading. The operational sequences of each mode are very nearly the same, whether operated on one assembly machine or another. The use of an envelope approach to accident analysis is facilitated by the use of classes of operations and the use of bounding case consequence analysis. A simple fault tree analysis of operational modes helps resolve which operations are sensitive to human error and which are initiated by hardware of software failures. Where possible, these errors and failures are blocked by TSR LCOs.
Report Numbers
E 1.99:la-ur--98-3597
E 1.99: conf-981106--
conf-981106--
la-ur--98-3597
Subject(s)
Other Subject(s)
Note
Published through SciTech Connect.
12/31/1998.
"la-ur--98-3597"
" conf-981106--"
"DE99002245"
American Nuclear Society winter meeting, Washington, DC (United States), 15-19 Nov 1998.
Butterfield, K.; Paternoster, R.
Funding Information
W-7405-ENG-36
View MARC record | catkey: 14363611