Possible consequences of operation with KIVN fuel elements in K Zircaloy process tubes [electronic resource].
- Washington, D.C. : United States. Dept. of Energy, 1963.
Oak Ridge, Tenn. : Distributed by the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Dept. of Energy.
- Physical Description:
- 5 pages : digital, PDF file
- Additional Creators:
- General Electric Company, United States. Department of Energy, and United States. Department of Energy. Office of Scientific and Technical Information
- Restrictions on Access:
- Free-to-read Unrestricted online access
- From considerations of the results of experimental simulations of non-axial placement of fuel elements in process tubes and in-reactor experience, it is concluded that the ultimate outcome of a charging error which results in operation with one or more unsupported fuel elements in a K Zircaloy-2 process tube would be multiple fuel failure and failure of the process tube. The outcome of the accident is determined by the speed with which the fuel failure is detected and the reactor is shut down. The release of fission products would be expected to be no greater than that which has occurred following severe fuel failure incidents. The highest probability for fission product release occurs during the discharge of failed fuel elements, when a small fraction of the exposed uranium of the fuel element may be oxidized when exposed to air before the element falls into the water-filled discharge chute. The confinement and fog spray facilities were installed to reduce the amount of fission products which might escape from the reactor building after such an event.
- Report Numbers:
- E 1.99:hw--78551
- Other Subject(s):
- Published through SciTech Connect.
- Type of Report and Period Covered Note:
- Topical; 08/01/1963 - 08/01/1963
- Funding Information:
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