Actions for The use of representative cases in hazard analysis of the tank waste remediation system at Hanford. The information in this document is a combination of HNF-SA-3168-A {ampersand} HNF-SA-3169-A - The control identification process [electronic resource].

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The use of representative cases in hazard analysis of the tank waste remediation system at Hanford. The information in this document is a combination of HNF-SA-3168-A {ampersand} HNF-SA-3169-A - The control identification process [electronic resource].

Published
Washington, D.C. : United States. Dept. of Energy, 1997.
Oak Ridge, Tenn. : Distributed by the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Dept. of Energy.
Physical Description
13 pages : digital, PDF file
Additional Creators
United States. Department of Energy and United States. Department of Energy. Office of Scientific and Technical Information
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Summary
During calendar year 1996, Duke Engineering and Services Hanford, Inc. conducted a safety analysis in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94 as part of the development of a Final Safety Analysis Report (TSAR) for the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) at the DOE Hanford site. The scope of the safety analysis of TWRS primarily addressed 177 large underground liquid waste storage tanks and associated equipment for transferring waste to and from tanks. The waste in the tanks was generated by the nuclear production and processing facilities at Hanford. The challenge facing the safety analysis team was to efficiently analyze the system within the time and budget allotted to provide the necessary and sufficient information for accident selection, control identification, and justification on the acceptability of the level of safety of TWRS. It was clear from the start that a hazard and accident analysis for each of the 177 similar tanks and supporting equipment was not practical nor necessary. For example, many of the tanks were similar enough that the results of the analysis of one tank would apply to many tanks. This required the development and use of a tool called the ''Hazard Topography''. The use of the Hazard Topography assured that all tank operations and configurations were adequately assessed in the hazard analysis and that the results (e.g., hazard identification and control decisions) were appropriately applied to all tanks and associated systems. The TWRS Hazard Topography was a data base of all the TWRS facilities (e.g., tanks, diversion boxes, transfer lines, and related facilities) along with data on their configuration, material at risk (MAR), hazards, and known safety related phenomenological issues. Facilities were then classified into groups based on similar combinations of configuration, MAR, hazards and phenomena. A hazard evaluation was performed for a tank or facility in each group. The results of these evaluations, also contained in a data base, were then mapped back to all TWRS facilities and used to select candidate accidents for the SAR. The Hazard Topography and hazard evaluation results were then used to support the identification of controls that address all TWRS facilities.
Report Numbers
E 1.99:hnf-sa-3169-fp
E 1.99: on: de98059764
E 1.99: br: ew3120071
br: ew3120071
on: de98059764
hnf-sa-3169-fp
Subject(s)
Other Subject(s)
Note
Published through SciTech Connect.
04/24/1997.
"hnf-sa-3169-fp"
" on: de98059764"
" br: ew3120071"
"DE98059764"
"EW3120071"
Niemi, B.J.
Funding Information
AC06-96RL13200
View MARC record | catkey: 14415137