Next Generation Safeguards Initiative [electronic resource] : Analysis of Probability of Detection of Plausible Diversion Scenarios at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants Using Advanced Safeguards
- Los Alamos, N.M. : Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2012.
Oak Ridge, Tenn. : Distributed by the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Dept. of Energy.
- Additional Creators:
- Los Alamos National Laboratory
United States. Department of Energy. Office of Scientific and Technical Information
- Over the last decade, efforts by the safeguards community, including inspectorates, governments, operators and owners of centrifuge facilities, have given rise to new possibilities for safeguards approaches in enrichment plants. Many of these efforts have involved development of new instrumentation to measure uranium mass and uranium-235 enrichment and inspection schemes using unannounced and random site inspections. We have chosen select diversion scenarios and put together a reasonable system of safeguards equipment and safeguards approaches and analyzed the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed safeguards approach by predicting the probability of detection of diversion in the chosen safeguards approaches. We analyzed the effect of redundancy in instrumentation, cross verification of operator instrumentation by inspector instrumentation, and the effects of failures or anomalous readings on verification data. Armed with these esults we were able to quantify the technical cost benefit of the addition of certain instrument suites and show the promise of these new systems.
- Published through SciTech Connect.
2012 INMM 53rd Annual Meeting ; 2012-07-15 - 2012-07-15 ; Orlando, Florida, United States.
Hase, Kevin R.; Boyer, Brian D.; Hawkins Erpenbeck, Heather.
- Funding Information:
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