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VARIATION OF STRIKE INCENTIVES IN DEEP REDUCTIONS [electronic resource].

Published
Washington, D.C. : United States. Dept. of Energy, 2001.
Oak Ridge, Tenn. : Distributed by the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Dept. of Energy.
Physical Description
226 Kilobytes pages : digital, PDF file
Additional Creators
Los Alamos National Laboratory, United States. Department of Energy, and United States. Department of Energy. Office of Scientific and Technical Information
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Summary
This note studies the sensitivity of strike incentives to deep offensive force reductions using exchange, cost, and game theoretic decision models derived and discussed in companion reports. As forces fall, weapon allocations shift from military to high value targets, with the shift being half complete at about 1,000 weapons. By 500 weapons, the first and second strikes are almost totally on high value. The dominant cost for striking first is that of damage to one's high value, which is near total absent other constraints, and hence proportional to preferences for survival of high value. Changes in military costs are largely offsetting, so total first strike costs change little. The resulting costs at decision nodes are well above the costs of inaction, so the preferred course is inaction for all offensive reductions studied. As the dominant cost for striking first is proportional to the preference for survival of high value. There is a wide gap between the first strike cost and that of inaction for the parameters studied here. These conclusions should be insensitive to significant reductions in the preference for survival of high value, which is the most sensitive parameter.
Report Numbers
E 1.99:la-ur-01-4596
la-ur-01-4596
Subject(s)
Other Subject(s)
Note
Published through SciTech Connect.
08/01/2001.
"la-ur-01-4596"
G.H. CAVAN.
Type of Report and Period Covered Note
Final; 08/01/2001 - 08/01/2001
Funding Information
W-7405-ENG-36
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