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Policy and technical issues for international safeguards in nuclear weapons states [electronic resource].

Published
Washington, D.C. : United States. Dept. of Energy, 1994.
Oak Ridge, Tenn. : Distributed by the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Dept. of Energy.
Physical Description
15 pages : digital, PDF file
Additional Creators
Los Alamos National Laboratory, United States. Department of Energy, and United States. Department of Energy. Office of Scientific and Technical Information
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Summary
Expansion of international safeguards into the military and commercial fuel cycles of the nuclear weapons states (NWS) -- the subject of previous proposals in international safeguards discussions and of studies in the safeguards literature -- has been given impetus by recent US government initiatives for safeguards on excess weapons materials and a verified fissile materials production cutoff. These proposals, if implemented, would have implications on the safeguards objectives, approaches, and technologies that are traditionally employed in international safeguards. This paper examines the modifications and innovations that might be required to the current international safeguards regime in meeting these proposed new roles. Although the examples given are in the context of the US materials and facilities, many of the conclusions are valid for other NWS. None of the statements in this paper represent official US position on policy for international safeguards in weapons states. Instead, the purpose is to identify policy and technical issues and to offer, where possible, options for their resolution. This paper limits consideration to the potential role of the IAEA in verifying these proposed initiatives for declared facilities, recognizing that there may also be a role for bilateral, multilateral, or regional verification regimes. Indeed, in some cases verification of weapons materials may be more appropriate for a bilateral arrangement. Because traditional IAEA safeguards may not be admissible for weapons materials, the concept of ``transparency`` is suggested as a less intrusive alternative providing some confidence that materials are as declared
Report Numbers
E 1.99:la-ur--94-0184
E 1.99: conf-940307--9
conf-940307--9
la-ur--94-0184
Subject(s)
Other Subject(s)
Note
Published through SciTech Connect.
02/01/1994.
"la-ur--94-0184"
" conf-940307--9"
"DE94006265"
International symposium on nuclear material safeguards,Vienna (Austria),14-18 Mar 1994.
Stanbro, W.D.; Markin, J.T.
Funding Information
W-7405-ENG-36
View MARC record | catkey: 14661012