Radiological considerations for top-up operation of the storage ring [electronic resource].
- Washington, D.C. : United States. Dept. of Energy, 1999. and Oak Ridge, Tenn. : Distributed by the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Dept. of Energy.
- Physical Description:
- 8 pages : digital, PDF file
- Additional Creators:
- Argonne National Laboratory, United States. Department of Energy, and United States. Department of Energy. Office of Scientific and Technical Information
- Restrictions on Access:
- Free-to-read Unrestricted online access
- Radiological considerations for the operation of the storage ring prior to top-up operation have been discussed in the document (MOE 94). This document was prepared to serve as the technical basis for the hazard analysis considerations and the statements in the APS Safety Assessment Document (SAD) dealing with shielding adequacy and other radiological considerations. The methodology used in that document and, subsequently, in the analysis of hazards from the low-energy undulator test line (MOE 98) was also used for shielding analysis and dose determinations in this document. The hazards and potential consequences of storage ring (SR) operation covered in (MOE 94) still apply to non-top-up operations of the SR. Two additional issues relevant to top-up operation, which give rise to potential radiological considerations, are (1) the possible use of the vertical scraper in the booster-to-storage ring (BTS) line to control the amount of charge that is being delivered to the storage ring, and (2) the potential accident situations, which give rise to radiation doses to individuals on the experiment hall floor and SR roof. By introducing the scraper, a portion of the beam produces a shower in the tungsten scraper, which leads to radiation fields on the top of the SR tunnel and in the Early Assembly Area (EAA). This requires additional shielding of the scraper. Potential doses to individuals on the floor of the experiment hall can result from a loss of particles down a photon beamline. Tracking results (COR 98) have shown that particles that find their way down a photon beamline will eventually be lost either in a Pb collimator or in the safety shutters in the front end of a bending magnet (BM), or on the safety shutters in an insertion device (ID) beamline. Either of these situations will result in a significant dose rate on the experiment hall floor if the event takes place during injection for top-up. Analyses of these and other accident scenarios are treated in this report. Minor doses will result from loss of a single stored beam in either of the above scenarios.
- Published through SciTech Connect., 05/25/1999., "ls-276", and Moe, H. J.
- Type of Report and Period Covered Note:
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