Space Shuttle Main Engine Quantitative Risk Assessment : Illustrating Modeling of a Complex System with a New QRA Software Package
- Author
- Smart, Christian
- Published
- 1998.
- Physical Description
- 1 electronic document
Online Version
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- Restrictions on Access
- Unclassified, Unlimited, Publicly available.
Free-to-read Unrestricted online access - Summary
- During 1997, a team from Hernandez Engineering, MSFC, Rocketdyne, Thiokol, Pratt & Whitney, and USBI completed the first phase of a two year Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of the Space Shuttle. The models for the Shuttle systems were entered and analyzed by a new QRA software package. This system, termed the Quantitative Risk Assessment System(QRAS), was designed by NASA and programmed by the University of Maryland. The software is a groundbreaking PC-based risk assessment package that allows the user to model complex systems in a hierarchical fashion. Features of the software include the ability to easily select quantifications of failure modes, draw Event Sequence Diagrams(ESDs) interactively, perform uncertainty and sensitivity analysis, and document the modeling. This paper illustrates both the approach used in modeling and the particular features of the software package. The software is general and can be used in a QRA of any complex engineered system. The author is the project lead for the modeling of the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs), and this paper focuses on the modeling completed for the SSMEs during 1997. In particular, the groundrules for the study, the databases used, the way in which ESDs were used to model catastrophic failure of the SSMES, the methods used to quantify the failure rates, and how QRAS was used in the modeling effort are discussed. Groundrules were necessary to limit the scope of such a complex study, especially with regard to a liquid rocket engine such as the SSME, which can be shut down after ignition either on the pad or in flight. The SSME was divided into its constituent components and subsystems. These were ranked on the basis of the possibility of being upgraded and risk of catastrophic failure. Once this was done the Shuttle program Hazard Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) were used to create a list of potential failure modes to be modeled. The groundrules and other criteria were used to screen out the many failure modes that did not contribute significantly to the catastrophic risk. The Hazard Analysis and FMEA for the SSME were also used to build ESDs that show the chain of events leading from the failure mode occurrence to one of the following end states: catastrophic failure, engine shutdown, or siccessful operation( successful with respect to the failure mode under consideration).
- Other Subject(s)
- Collection
- NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS) Collection.
- Note
- Document ID: 19980210866.
NASA/TM-1998-208244.
NAS 1.15:208244.
PSAM IV; 13-18 sEP. 1998; New York, NY; United States. - Terms of Use and Reproduction
- No Copyright.
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