Narrative and the making of US national security / Ronald R. Krebs
- Krebs, Ronald R., 1974-
- Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Physical Description:
- xvi, 387 pages ; 24 cm.
- Cambridge studies in international relations ; 138
- Machine generated contents note: 1. Narrating national security; Part I. Crisis, Authority, and Rhetorical Mode: The Fate of Narrative Projects, from the Battle against Isolationism to the War on Terror: 2. Domination and the art of storytelling; 3. Narrative lost: missed and mistaken opportunities; 4. Narrative won: opportunities seized; Part II. Narrative at War: Politics and Rhetorical Strategy in the Military Crucible, from Korea to Iraq: 5. The narrative politics of the battlefield; 6. Tracking the cold war consensus; 7. Tracing the cold war consensus; 8. Puzzles of the cold war, lessons for the terror war; 9. Narrative in an age of fracture; Appendices.
- "Dominant narratives - from the Cold War consensus to the War on Terror - have often served as the foundation for debates over national security. Weaving current challenges, past failures and triumphs, and potential futures into a coherent tale, with well-defined characters and plot lines, these narratives impart meaning to global events, define the boundaries of legitimate politics, and thereby shape national security policy. However, we know little about why or how such narratives rise and fall. Drawing on insights from diverse fields, Narrative and the Making of US National Security offers novel arguments about where these dominant narratives come from, how they become dominant, and when they collapse. It evaluates these arguments carefully against evidence drawn from US debates over national security from the 1930s to the 2000s and shows how these narrative dynamics have shaped the policies the United States has pursued"-- and "In the winter of 2007, as Americans grew increasingly weary of a protracted and seemingly unwinnable war in Iraq, President George W. Bush bucked the political winds and, rather than bring the troops home, called for dispatching more forces, a "surge." This would be a last-ditch effort to bring order to Iraq, which had known little peace since US forces had invaded the country and toppled Saddam Hussein's regime four years before. But, while the military struggled to dominate the battlefield in Iraq, Bush faced a rhetorical insurgency at home. This was not a surge, many Democrats warned, but a dangerous "escalation." Failing to back the surge was tantamount to capitulating to "Jihadist Joe, " one Republican congressman memorably charged"--
- 9781107103955 (hardback), 1107103959 (hardback), 9781107503991 (paperback), and 110750399X (paperback)
- Bibliography Note:
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
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