Actions for Thinking in promises
Thinking in promises / Mark Burgess
- Author
- Burgess, Mark, 1966-
- Additional Titles
- Thinking in promises : designing systems for cooperation
- Published
- Sebastopol, CA : O'Reilly Media, [2015]
- Copyright Date
- ©2015
- Edition
- First edition.
- Physical Description
- 1 online resource
Access Online
- Contents
- Machine generated contents note: Promise Engineering -- From Commands to Promises -- Why Is a Promise Better than a Command? -- Autonomy Leads to Greater Certainty -- The Observer Is Always Right -- Culture and Psychology -- Nonlocality of Obligations -- Isn't That Quasi-Science? -- Is Promise Theory Really a Theory? -- The Main Concepts -- How Much Certainty Do You Need? -- A Quick User Guide -- Just Make It Happen -- An Exercise -- An Imposition Too Far -- Reformulating Your World into Promises -- Proxies for Human Agency -- What Are the Agencies of Promises? -- What Issues Do We Make Promises About? -- What Things Can Be Promised? -- What Things Can't Be Promised? -- The Lifecycle of Promises -- Keeping Promises -- Cooperation: The Polarity of Give and Take -- How Much Does a Promise Binding Count? -- Promises and Trust Are Symbiotic -- Promoting Certainty -- Some Exercises -- What We Mean by Assessment -- Kinds of Promise Assessment -- Relativity: Many Worlds, Branches, and Their Observers -- Relativity and Levels of Perception -- Inferred Promises: Emergent Behaviour -- How Promises Define Agent-Perceived Roles -- The Economics of Promise Value: Beneficial Outcomes -- Human Reliability -- The Eye of the Beholder -- Some Exercises -- The Laws of Conditional Promising -- Local Quenching of Conditionals -- Assisted Promises -- Conditional Causation and Dependencies -- Circular Conditional Bindings: The Deadlock Carousel -- The Curse of Conditions, Safety Valves -- Other Circular Promises -- Logic and Reasoning: The Limitations of Branching and Linear Thinking -- Some Exercises -- Engineering Autonomous Agents -- Promisees, Stakeholders, and Trading Promises -- Broken Promises -- What Are the Prerequisites for Cooperation? -- Who Is Responsible for Keeping Promises? -- Mutual Bindings and Equilibrium of Agreement -- Incompatible Promises: Conflicts of Intent -- Cooperating for Availability and the Redundancy Conundrum -- Agreement as Promises: Consensus of Intent -- Contractual Agreement -- Contracts and Signing -- Agreement in Groups -- Promoting Cooperation by Incentive: Beneficial Outcome -- The Stability of Cooperation: What Axelrod Said -- The Need to Be Needed: Reinterpreting an Innate Incentive? -- Avoiding Conflicts of Interest -- Emergent Phenomena as Collective Equilibria: Forming Superagents -- Guiding the Outcome of Cooperation When It Is Emergent -- Stability of Intent: Erratic Behaviour? -- When Being Not of One Mind Is an Advantage -- Human Error or Misplaced Intent? -- Organization: Centralization Versus Decentralization -- Focused Interventions or Sweeping Policies? -- Societies and Functional Roles -- Relationships: What Dunbar Said -- Some Exercises -- Reasoning with Cause -- Componentization: Divide and Build! -- What Do We Mean by Components? -- What Systemic Promises Should Components Keep? -- Can Agents Themselves Have Components? (Superagents) -- Component Design and Roles -- Components Need to Be Assembled -- Fragile Promises in Component Design -- Reusability of Components -- Interchangeability of Components -- Compatibility of Components -- Backward Compatibility -- Upgrading and Regression Testing of Components 'or Designing Promises for a Market -- Law of the Lowest Common Denominator -- Imposing Requirements: False Expectations -- Component Choices That You Can't Go Back On -- The Art of Versioning -- Names and Identifiers for "Branding" Component Promises -- Naming Promisee Usage (-) Rather than Function (+) -- The Cost of Modularity -- Some Exercises -- The Client-Server Model -- Responsibility for Service Delivery -- Dispatchers and Queues for Service on Demand -- Delivering Service Through Intermediaries or Proxies -- Framing Promises as State or Action -- Delivery Chains by Imposition -- Delivery Chains with Promises -- Formality Helps the Medicine Go Down -- Chains of Intermediaries -- End-to-End Integrity -- Transformation Chains or Assembly Lines -- Continuity of Delivery and Intent -- The Versioning Problem Again -- Avoiding Conflicting Promises by Branching into Separate Worlds -- Avoiding Many Worlds' Branches by Converging on Target -- Backwards Compatibility Means Continuity of Intent -- Assessing a Service by Promising to Use It (Testing) -- Some Exercises -- How Information Becomes Knowledge -- Knowledge: The Mystery Cat -- Passing Information Around -- Categories Are Roles Made into Many World Branches -- Superagent Aggregation (Expialidocious) -- Thinking in Straight Lines -- Knowledge Engineering -- Equilibrium and Common Knowledge -- Integrity of Information Through Intermediaries -- Relativity of Information -- Promising Consistency Across Multiple Agents and CAP -- A Is for Availability -- C Is for Consistency -- P Is for Partition Tolerance -- The World Is My Database, I Shall Not Want -- Some Exercises -- What Is a System? -- The Myth of System and User -- Systemic Promises -- Who Intends Systemic Promises? -- Breaking Down the Systemic Promises for Real Agencies -- Why Do Systems Succeed or Fail in Keeping Promises? -- Complexity, Separation, and Modularity -- The Collapse of Complex Systems -- Through the Lens of Promises.
- Subject(s)
- ISBN
- 9781491918494 (electronic bk.)
1491918497 (electronic bk.)
9781491918487 (electronic bk.)
1491918489 (electronic bk.)
9781491917879
9781491917862
1491917865 - Note
- Includes index.
- Source of Acquisition
- Purchased with funds from the J. Harvey Fahnestock Endowment for Scientific, Engineering and Rare Books; 2015
- Endowment Note
- J. Harvey Fahnestock Endowment for Scientific, Engineering and Rare Books
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