The rationality of perception / Susanna Siegel

Author: Siegel, Susanna
Published: Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2017.
Copyright Date: ©2017
Edition: First edition.
Physical Description: xxv, 220 pages ; 23 cm

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Contents

Machine generated contents note: pt. I The Problem and Its Solution -- 1.The Problem of Hijacked Experience -- 2.The Solution Sketched -- 2.1."Rational" and "Reasonable" -- 2.2.Perceptual Experiences Can Be Formed Rationally or Irrationally -- 2.3.Significance -- 2.4.Solving the Problem of Hijacked Experience -- 2.4.1.Why not settle for less? -- 2.5.What Kind of Normative Property Is Epistemic Charge? -- 2.6.A Constructive Defense -- 3.Epistemic Charge -- 3.1.Does Anything Preclude Experiences from Being Epistemically Charged? -- 3.2.Experience and Belief -- 3.3.Epistemic Charge -- 3.4.The Scope and Ground of Epistemic Charge -- 3.4.1.Phenomenal grounds and the structure of justification -- 3.4.2.Inference: ground vs. mere modulator -- pt. II Defending the Solution: The Epistemic Profile of Experience -- Introduction to Part II -- 4.Epistemic Downgrade -- 4.1.Baseline Epistemic Powers of Experience -- 4.1.1.Minimal bearers of baseline epistemic powers -- 4.1.2.Epistemic powers are relativized to contents -- 4.1.3.Epistemic powers and baseline epistemic powers -- 4.2.Epistemic Downgrade -- 4.3.The Downgrade Thesis -- 4.4.Are the Subsequent Beliefs Ill-founded? -- 4.5.Do Hijacked Experiences Generate a Defeater? -- 4.6.The Downgrade Thesis and Theories of Perceptual Justification -- 4.7.Epistemic Upgrade and Enrichment -- 5.Inference without Reckoning -- 5.1.Three Starting Assumptions -- 5.2.What Kind of Response Is Inferring? -- 5.2.1.Failures to respond -- 5.2.2.Responses to non-informational states -- 5.2.3.Non-inferential responses -- 5.2.4.Epistemic differences between poor inference and non-inference -- 5.3.Responding by Regulating -- 5.4.The Reckoning Model -- 5.5.Reckoning Is Not Needed for Inference -- 5.6.The Scope of Inference in the Mind -- 6.How Experiences Can Lose Power from Inference -- 6.1.Three Kinds of Inappropriate Inference -- 6.2.Inferentially Inappropriate Routes to Experience -- 6.2.1.Circularity and inherited inappropriateness -- 6.2.2.Circularity in Bayesian theories of inference -- 6.2.3.Jumping to conclusions -- 6.2.4.Bayesian inference to binary experience: the rounding-off problem -- 6.3.How Inference Can Explain Epistemic Downgrade -- 6.3.1.Is inference irrelevant to epistemic downgrade? -- 7.How Experiences Can Gain Power from Inference -- 7.1.What Would It Be to Gain Power from Inference? -- 7.2.Does Inference Always Lead to Epistemic Downgrade? -- 7.3.Can Inferences Ever Lead to Epistemic Upgrade? -- pt. III Applications -- Introduction to Part III -- 8.Evaluative Perception -- 8.1.Fearful Seeing -- 8.1.1.The outlook internal to fear -- 8.1.2.Fearful outlooks and inference -- 8.2.Wishful Seeing -- 9.Selection Effects -- 9.1.Norms of Attention -- 9.2.The Epistemic Problem in the Hiring Example -- 9.3.How Might Uncongenial Information Get Excluded? -- 9.3.1.Preventing intake -- 9.4.From Selection of Evidence to Selection for Experience -- 10.The Problem of Culturally Normal Belief -- 10.1.The Structure of Racial Attitudes Elicited in the Experiments -- 10.2.Are Racial Attitudes Minimal Associations? -- 10.3.Whit and his Route to the Racialized Attitude -- 10.3.1.Is Whit's racial attitude well-founded? -- 10.3.2.Normality as testimony -- 10.3.3.The mind of the world -- 10.3.4.The social frame -- 10.4.The Argument from Maintenance -- 10.5.Are Presumptions in the Mind of the World Epistemically Appraisable? -- 10.6.Conclusion: The Scope of Epistemic Norms.

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ISBN

0198797087
9780198797081

Bibliography Note

Includes bibliographical references (pages 199-213) and indexes.

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The rationality of perception / Susanna Siegel

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