Knowledge, dexterity, and attention : a theory of epistemic agency / Abrol Fairweather, San Francisco State University, Carlos Montemayor, San Francisco State University
- Machine generated contents note: 1.1.Aims and Motivations -- 1.2.Dexterity, Attention, and Integration -- 1.3.A Brief Summary of Chapters -- 1.4.A Tension in Virtue Epistemology -- 1.5.Virtue Theoretic Epistemic Psychology -- 1.6.The Attention-Assertion Model -- 1.7.Methodology in Epistemology -- 1.Epistemic Virtue, Reliable Attention, and Cognitive Constitution -- 1.1.The Argument from Attention -- 1.2.Dispositions and Epistemic Abilities -- 1.3.The Situationist Challenge -- 1.4.Knowledge of Syntax -- 1.5.Knowledge of Logic -- 1.6.Arguments against Consequentialist Epistemic Norms -- 2.Meta-epistemology and Epistemic Agency -- 2.1.On the Role of Motivational States -- 2.2.The Direction of Attention: Self or World -- 2.3.Cognitive Needs -- 2.4.The Desire to Assert: The Content of Epistemic Motivation -- 2.5.Epistemic Needs and the Grip of Epistemic Norms -- 2.6.Frege on the Grip of Assertion -- 2.7.The Frame Problem and Virtuous Insensitivity -- 2.8.Some Concerns about Internal Normative Force -- 3.Success Semantics and the Etiology of Success -- 3.1.The "Because of" Requirement for Knowledge -- 3.2.Greco's Contextualist Etiology -- 3.3.Causality: Folksy, Metaphysical, and Psychologically Constrained -- 3.4.Success Semantics and the Etiology of Success -- 3.5.Peirce, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey: Reliability and Assertion -- 3.6.The Norm of Assertion -- 3.7.Assertion and Action -- 4.Epistemic Agency -- 4.1.Tensions between Credit, Agency, and Automaticity -- 4.2.Sosa's Judgments and Functionings: Personal and Sub-personal Success -- 4.3.Mental and Epistemic Action -- 4.4.Resolving the Tension -- 4.5.Language and Agency -- 5.Assertion as Epistemic Motivation -- 5.1.Attention and Communication -- 5.2.Dispositions to Assert and Successful Communication -- 5.3.Forms of Assertoric Force and Forms of Epistemic Attention -- 5.4.Factivity, Credit, and Social Environments -- 5.5.Epistemically Virtuous Halting Thresholds and Assertable Contents: The Case of Epistemic Modals -- 5.6.Retraction and Virtuous Sensitivity -- 5.7.Conclusion -- 6.Curiosity and Epistemic Achievement -- 6.1.Epistemically Virtuous Curiosity -- 6.2.Basic Principles of Curiosity -- 6.3.Curiosity and Halting Thresholds -- 6.4.Curiosity and Virtuous Insensitivity -- 6.5.Attention, Curiosity, and Creativity -- 7.Collective Agency, Assertion, and Information -- 7.1.Collective Epistemic Agency and Cognitive Integration -- 7.2.Collective Agency and Reliable Social Communication -- 7.3.Social Epistemology and Collective Assertion -- 7.4.Collective Attention and Collective Motivation -- 7.5.Reflection, Explicit Judgment, and Reliability -- 7.6.Complex Collective Agency.
- Contemporary cognitive science clearly tells us that attention is modulated for speech and action. While these forms of goal-directed attention are very well researched in psychology, they have not been sufficiently studied by epistemologists. In this book, Abrol Fairweather and Carlos Montemayor develop and defend a theory of epistemic achievements that requires the manifestation of cognitive agency. They examine empirical work on the psychology of attention and assertion, and use it to ground a normative theory of epistemic achievements and virtues. The resulting study is the first sustained naturalized virtue epistemology, and will be of interest to readers in epistemology, cognitive science, and beyond.
- 9781107089822 hardcover and 1107089824 hardcover
- Bibliography Note:
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Issuing Body:
- Act (Philosophy).
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