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Structured to fail? : regulatory performance under competing mandates / Christopher Carrigan

Author
Carrigan, Christopher
Published
Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Copyright Date
©2017
Physical Description
xv, 320 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm

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Contents
1. Linking regulatory failures to organizational design -- Part I. Examining the Performance of Multiple-Purpose Regulators -- 2. Isolated effects or widespread dysfunction? -- 3. Appealing to goal ambiguity to explain performance -- Part II. Assessing the Role of Regulatory Agency Design in the Gulf Oil Disaster -- 4. Balancing conflict and coordination at MMS -- 5. Politics and offshore oil and gas policy -- Part III. A Theory of Multiple-Purpose Regulators -- 6. Policy context and the political choice to combine purposes -- 7. Operations, organization, politics, and policy context.
Summary
"Regulatory Performance under Competing Mandates In the search for explanations for three of the most pressing crises of the early twenty-first century (the housing meltdown and financial crisis, the Gulf oil spill, and the nuclear disaster at Fukushima), commentators pointed to the structure of the regulatory agencies charged with overseeing the associated industries, noting that the need to balance competing regulatory and non-regulatory missions undermined each agency's ability to be an effective regulator. Christopher Carrigan challenges this critique by employing a diverse set of research methods, including a statistical analysis, an in- depth case study of US regulatory oversight of offshore oil and gas development leading up to the Gulf oil spill, and a formal theoretical discussion, to systematically evaluate the benefits and concerns associated with either combining or separating regulatory and non-regulatory missions. His analysis demonstrates for policymakers and scholars why assigning competing non-regulatory missions to regulatory agencies can still be better than separating them in some cases"--
"In the search for explanations for three of the most pressing crises of the early twenty-first century (the housing meltdown and financial crisis, the Gulf oil spill, and the nuclear disaster at Fukushima), commentators pointed to the structure of the regulatory agencies charged with overseeing the associated industries, noting that the need to balance competing regulatory and non-regulatory missions undermined each agency's ability to be an effective regulator. Christopher Carrigan challenges this critique by employing a diverse set of research methods, including a statistical analysis, an in-depth case study of US regulatory oversight of offshore oil and gas development leading up to the Gulf oil spill, and a formal theoretical discussion, to systematically evaluate the benefits and concerns associated with either combining or separating regulatory and non-regulatory missions. His analysis demonstrates for policymakers and scholars why assigning competing non-regulatory missions to regulatory agencies can still be better than separating them in some cases"--
Subject(s)
ISBN
9781107181694 hardcover
1107181690 hardcover
9781316632802 paperback
1316632806 paperback
Bibliography Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 288-307) and index.
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