Game theory, diplomatic history and security studies / Frank C. Zagare
- Introduction -- Part I. Overview -- Game theory and security studies -- Game theory and diplomatic history -- Part II. Diplomatic history -- The Moroccan crisis of 1905-6 -- A game-theoretic history of the Cuban Missile Crisis -- A general explanation of the Cuban Missile Crisis -- Explaining the 1914 war in Europe -- Part III. Security studies -- Perfect deterrence theory -- Explaining the long peace -- Postscript.
- Known as the science of strategy, game theory is a branch of mathematics that has gained broad acceptance as a legitimate methodological tool, and has been widely adapted by a number of other fields. Frank C. Zagare provides an introduction to the application of game theory in the fields of security studies and diplomatic history, demonstrating the advantages of using a formal game-theoretic framework to explain complex events and strategic relationships. Comprised of three parts, the first illustrates the basic concepts of game theory, initially with abstract examples but later in the context of real world foreign policy decision-making. The author highlights the methodological problems of using game theory to construct an analytic narrative and the advantages of working around these obstacles. Part II develops three extended case studies that illustrate the theory at work: the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905-1906, the July Crisis of 1914, and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Finally, in Part III, Zagare describes a general theory of interstate conflict initiation, limitation, escalation, and resolution and rebuts criticisms of the methodology.
- 9780198831587 (hardback)
- Bibliography Note:
- Includes bibliographical references (pages 167-179) and index.
- Source of Acquisition:
- Purchased with funds from the Barbara S. Klein Libraries Collection Endowment in Art History and International Affairs; 2018
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