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The community of advantage : a behavioural economist's defence of the market / Robert Sugden

Author
Sugden, Robert
Published
Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2018.
Copyright Date
©2018
Edition
First edition.
Physical Description
1 online resource
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Contents
Cover; The Community of Advantage: A Behavioural Economist's Defence of the Market; Copyright; Preface; Contents; List of Figures; Sources of Material; 1: The Liberal Tradition and the Challenge from Behavioural Economics; 1.1 Mill and the Community of Advantage; 1.2 Neoclassical Welfare Economics; 1.3 The Challenge from Behavioural Economics; 1.4 Reconciling Normative and Behavioural Economics; 2: The View from Nowhere; 2.1 The Impartial Spectator; 2.2 The Benevolent Autocrat; 2.3 Public Reasoning; 3: The Contractarian Perspective; 3.1 Hobbes's Contractarianism; 3.2 Hume's Contractarianism., 3.3 The Contractarian Perspective3.4 Why a Contractarian Cannot be a Paternalist; 3.5 The Four Alls; 4: The Inner Rational Agent; 4.1 Behavioural Welfare Economics: The New Consensus; 4.2 Autonomy and the Model of the Inner Rational Agent; 4.3 System 1 and System 2; 4.4 Does the Concept of Latent Preference Have Empirical Content?; 4.5 SuperReasoner in the Cafeteria; 4.6 Savage and Allais; 4.7 Purifying Allais Paradox Preferences; 4.8 Akrasia; 4.9 Summing up; 5: Opportunity; 5.1 The Individual Opportunity Criterion; 5.2 Preference-satisfaction; 5.3 'Mere' Preferences?, 5.4 Opportunity when Preferences are Liable to Change5.5 The Continuing Person; 5.6 Responsibility; 6: The Invisible Hand; 6.1 The Basic Idea; 6.2 Exchange Economies; 6.3 The Interactive Opportunity Criterion; 6.4 The Strong Interactive Opportunity Criterion; 6.5 Competitive Equilibrium; 6.6 The Strong Market Opportunity Theorem; 6.7 Production; 6.8 Storage Economies; 6.9 The Wine Economy and the Responsible Agent; 6.10 How the Invisible Hand Works; 7: Regulation; 7.1 Neoclassical Arguments for Regulation; 7.2 Choice Overload; 7.3 Self-constraint; 7.4 Obfuscation., 7.5 Fixed Costs and Price Discrimination7.6 Public Goods; 7.7 Otto per Mille; 8: Psychological Stability; 8.1 Equality of Opportunity; 8.2 The Division of Knowledge; 8.3 The Other Invisible Hand; 8.4 Why Markets Cannot Be Fair; 8.5 Looking Forward; 8.6 Can Everyone Expect to Benefit from the Market?; 8.7 Underwriting Expectations of Mutual Benefit; 9: Intrinsic Motivation, Kindness, and Reciprocity; 9.1 The Virtue-ethical Critique of the Market; 9.2 Intrinsic Motivation and Crowding-out; 9.3 Reciprocity: The Experimental Evidence; 9.4 Reciprocity and Social Preferences., and 9.5 Reciprocity and Social Norms9.6 Escaping from the Paradox of Trust; 10: Cooperative Intentions; 10.1 Team Reasoning; 10.2 Practices; 10.3 Voluntariness in a Simple Model; 10.4 Voluntariness Generalized; 10.5 Intending Mutual Benefit; 10.6 Four Examples; 11: The Principle of Mutual Benefit; 11.1 Morality and Norms; 11.2 A Contractarian Perspective on Morality; 11.3 The Principle of Mutual Benefit; 11.4 How the Principle of Mutual Benefit can be Self-sustaining; 11.5 A Question too Far; 11.6 Correspondence of Sentiments; 11.7 The Community of Advantage; Endnotes.
Summary
Normative analysis in economics usually aims at satisfying individuals' preferences, valuing economic freedom and viewing markets favourably. Behavioural research, however, shows that individuals' preferences are often unstable. Robert Sugden proposes a reformulation of normative economics compatible with psychology of choice.
Subject(s)
ISBN
9780192558787 (electronic bk.)
0192558781 (electronic bk.)
9780191863813
0191863815
Bibliography Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
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