The normative and the evaluative : the buck-passing account of value / Richard Rowland
- Rowland, Richard
- Oxford ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2019.
- First edition.
- Physical Description:
- viii, 239 pages ; 24 cm
- Machine generated contents note: 1.Introduction -- 1.1.Normative reasons for pro-attitudes -- 1.2.The buck-passing account of value -- 1.3.Motivations for the buck-passing account -- 1.4.Overview of the book -- 1.5.Clarifying the buck-passing account -- pt. I Motivation -- 2.The Value-First Account and First-Order Neutrality -- 2.1.The requirement of neutrality -- 2.2.Value-of-the-object-first and deontology -- 2.3.Other value-first accounts and first-order neutrality -- 3.The Value-First Account and the Unity of the Normative -- 3.1.The case for the unity of the normative -- 3.2.The value-first account and the unity of the normative -- 3.3.Against the value-first account of reasons for belief -- 3.4.Objections to the unity of the normative -- 4.The Buck-Passing Account and The No-Priority View -- 4.1.Explaining the correlation between reasons and value -- 4.2.Explaining the fact that value never provides non-derivative reasons -- 4.3.Grounding reasons in value -- 4.4.Qualitative parsimony -- 4.5.Explaining similarities between theoretical debates about reasons and about value -- 4.6.The case against the no-priority view -- 5.Reasons as The Unity among the Varieties of Goodness -- 5.1.The need for an explanation of the unity among the varieties of goodness -- 5.2.A buck-passing account of good for -- 5.3.Objections to the buck-passing account of good for -- 5.4.A buck-passing account of goodness of a kind -- 5.5.Objections to the buck-passing account of goodness of a kind -- 5.6.The case for the buck-passing account of value -- pt. II Defence -- 6.Too Much Value? -- 6.1.The wrong kind of reason problem -- 6.2.Having a pro-attitude towards x for x's own sake -- 6.3.The demon's threat and normative and motivating reasons -- 6.4.The generality of reasons to desire and admire -- 6.5.Explaining the error -- 6.6.If the wrong kind of reason problem cannot be dissolved, it can be solved -- 7.Too Little Value? -- 7.1.The trans-world reasons response -- 7.2.Reisner on the trans-world reasons response -- 7.3.The counterfactual response -- 7.4.Reisner on the counterfactual response -- 7.5.Bykvist's too much variation in value objection -- 8.Not Sufficiently Neutral? -- 8.1.Deontology and the consequentialist/deontological distinction -- 8.2.Consequentialism about reasons for pro-attitudes -- 8.3.Williams's internalism -- 9.Other Evaluative Concepts and Properties -- 9.1.The buck-passing account and the thick evaluative -- 9.2.Problems with pro-attitudes? -- 9.3.We should accept the buck-passing account of value -- pt. III Extensions -- 10.A Buck-Passing Account of Morality -- 10.1.A buck-passing account of morality: articulation -- 10.2.Motivation: reasons to accept the buck-passing account -- 10.3.Defence: objections to the amends-based buck-passing account -- 11.Reasons First -- 11.1.Reasons and oughts -- 11.2.Are reasons just good bases? -- 11.3.A dilemma for putting fittingness first -- 11.4.Are there reasons to put fittingness first? -- 11.5.A unified account of the practically normative.
- Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good there just have to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to this account, for pleasure to be good there need to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. Likewise for liberty and equality to be values there have to be reasons for us to promote and preserve them. Extensive discussion has focussed on some of the problems that the buck-passing account faces, such as the 'wrong kind of reason' problem. Less attention, however, has been paid as to why we should accept the buck-passing account or what the theoretical pay-offs and other implications of accepting it are. The Normative and the Evaluative provides the first comprehensive0motivation and defence of the buck-passing account of value. Richard Rowland argues that the buck-passing account explains several important features of the relationship between reasons and value, as well as the relationship between the different varieties of value, in a way that its competitors do not. He shows that alternatives to the buck-passing account are inconsistent with important views in normative ethics, uninformative, and at odds with the way in which we should see practical and0epistemic normativity as related. In addition, he extends the buck-passing account to provide an account of moral properties as well as all other normative and deontic properties and concepts, such as fittingness and 'ought', in terms of reasons.
- 019883361X hardcover
- Bibliography Note:
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
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