Actions for Evolutionary games in natural, social, and virtual worlds

Email RIS file
Bookmark
Report an Issue

Evolutionary games in natural, social, and virtual worlds / Daniel Friedman and Barry Sinervo

Author
Friedman, Daniel, 1947-
Published
New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2016.
Physical Description
1 online resource : illustrations (black and white)
Additional Creators
Sinervo, Barry
Access Online

Availability

I Want It
I Want It

Finding items...

Contents
Machine generated contents note: pt. ONE Basics -- 1.Population Dynamics -- 1.1.Fitness -- 1.2.Tradeoffs and fitness dependence -- 1.3.Dependence on environment, density, and frequency -- 1.4.State space geometry -- 1.5.Memes and genes -- 1.6.Finite populations and randomness -- 1.7.Replicator dynamics in discrete time -- 1.8.Replicator dynamics in continuous time -- 1.9.Steady states and stability -- 1.10.Sexual dynamics -- 1.11.Discussion -- Appendix A Derivation of the Fisher equation -- Appendix B Replicator dynamics, mean fitness, and entropy -- Exercises -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 2.Simple Frequency Dependence -- 2.1.The Hawk-Dove game -- 2.2.H-D parameters and dynamics -- 2.3.The three kinds of 2 x 2 games -- 2.4.Dilemmas played by viruses and eBay sellers -- 2.5.Nonlinear frequency dependence -- 2.6.RPS and the simplex -- 2.7.Replicator dynamics for RPS -- 2.8.Discussion -- Appendix: Payoff differences in 3 x 3 games -- Exercises -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 3.Dynamics in n-Dimensional Games -- 3.1.Sectoring the 2-d simplex -- 3.2.Estimating 3 x 3 payoff matrices -- 3.3.More strategies -- 3.4.Nonlinear frequency dependence -- 3.5.Two-population games: The square -- 3.6.Hawk-Dove with two populations -- 3.7.Own-population effects -- 3.8.Higher-dimensional games -- 3.9.Alternative dynamics -- 3.10.Discussion -- Appendix: Estimating 3 x 3 payoff matrices -- Exercises -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 4.Equilibrium -- 4.1.Equilibrium in 1 dimension -- 4.2.Nash equilibrium with n strategies -- 4.3.ESS with n strategies -- 4.4.Equilibrium in multi-population games -- 4.5.Fisherian runaway equilibrium -- 4.6.Discussion -- Appendix: Techniques to Assess Stability -- Exercises -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 5.Social Games -- 5.1.Assortative matching -- 5.2.Social twists -- 5.3.Inheritance from two parents -- 5.4.The standard Price equation -- 5.5.Group-structured Price equation and cooperation -- 5.6.Group structure and assortativity in lizards -- 5.7.Price equation in continuous time -- 5.8.Discussion -- Appendix: Equilibrium in the Kirkpatrick (1982) model -- Exercises -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 6.Cellular Automaton Games -- 6.1.Specifying a CA -- 6.2.Prisoner s dilemma -- 6.3.Snowdrift -- 6.4.Public goods games with two strategies -- 6.5.Spatial rock-paper-scissors dynamic -- 6.6.Application to bacterial strains -- 6.7.Buyer-Seller game as a two-population CA -- Exercises -- Notes -- Bibliography -- pt. TWO APPLICATIONS -- 7.Rock-Paper-Scissors Everywhere -- 7.1.Some RPS theory -- 7.2.Humans play RPS in the lab -- 7.3.RPS mating systems -- 7.4.Predators learn -- 7.5.A co-evolutionary model of predators and prey -- 7.6.Discussion -- Appendix -- Exercises -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 8.Learning in Games -- 8.1.Perspectives on learning and evolution -- 8.2.An empirical example -- 8.3.Learning rules -- 8.4.Decision rules -- 8.5.Estimating a model -- 8.6.Results -- 8.7.Learning in continuous time -- 8.8.Other models of learning -- 8.9.Open frontiers -- Appendix: Towards models of learning in continuous time -- Exercises -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 9.Contingent Life-Cycle Strategies -- 9.1.Hawks, doves, and plasticity -- 9.2.Costly plasticity -- 9.3.Classic life-cycle analysis -- 9.4.Strategic life-cycle analysis: Two periods -- 9.5.Strategic life-cycle analysis: More general cases -- 9.6.Application: Male elephant seals -- 9.7.Discussion -- Appendix: Formalizing a perfect lifetime equilibrium -- Exercises -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 10.The Blessing and the Curse of the Multiplicative Updates / Manfred K. Warmuth -- 10.1.Demonstrating the blessing and the curse -- 10.2.Dispelling the curse -- 10.3.Discussion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 11.Traffic Games / John Musacchio -- 11.1.Simple non-atomic traffic games -- 11.2.Braess's paradox -- 11.3.The price of anarchy with nonlinear latency functions -- 11.4.Pigovian taxes -- 11.5.Selfish pricing -- 11.6.Circuit analogy -- 11.7.Discussion -- Exercises -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 12.International Trade and the Environment / Matthew McGinty -- 12.1.Economics and Evolutionary Game Theory -- 12.2.Static Cournot model -- 12.3.Green technology diffusion -- 12.4.International trade -- 12.5.International trade and pollution taxation -- 12.6.Other economic applications -- Exercises -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 13.Evolution of Cooperation -- 13.1.Coordination, cooperation, and social dilemmas -- 13.2.Solution K: Kin selection -- 13.3.Solution R: Bilateral reciprocity -- 13.4.Social preferences: A problematic solution -- 13.5.Early human niches -- 13.6.Solution M: Moral memes -- 13.7.Illustrative models -- 13.8.Prehistoric and historic moral codes -- 13.9.Discussion -- Exercises -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 14.Speciation -- 14.1.Long-run evolution -- 14.2.Adaptive dynamics -- 14.3.Morph loss in RPS -- 14.4.Emergent boundary layers in cellular automata -- 14.5.Speciation in social and virtual worlds -- 14.6.Discussion -- Exercises -- Notes -- Bibliography.
Summary
Authors Daniel Friedman and Barry Sinervo show how to use theoretical developments in evolutionary game theory to build useful models describing parts of the worlds we live in - the natural world of biology, the social world of politics, economics, etc., and the virtual world that is emerging from our connected electronic devices.
Subject(s)
ISBN
9780190466657 (ebook)
Audience Notes
Specialized.
Note
Previously issued in print: 2016.
Bibliography Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
View MARC record | catkey: 28928260