From a rational point of view : how we represent subjective perspectives in practical discourse / Tim Henning
- Author
- Henning, Tim, 1976-
- Published
- Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Edition
- First edition.
- Physical Description
- 1 online resource : illustrations (black and white)
Access Online
- Oxford scholarship online: ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu
- Contents
- Machine generated contents note: 1.Parentheticalism about "Believe" -- 1.1.The Puzzle of Transparency -- 1.2.Indirect Accounts and the Problem from Gricean Maxims -- 1.3.Introducing Parentheticalism -- 1.4.Transparency as a Special Case of a More General Phenomenon -- 1.5.Compositionality and the Embedding Problem -- 1.6.Parentheticalism about "Believe" in Some More Detail -- 1.7.Parenthetical Statements, Perspective-Shifting, and Indicative Conditionals -- 2.Parentheticalism about "Want" -- 2.1.In Favor of Parentheticalism about "Want" -- 2.2.Parentheticalism about "Want" in Some More Detail -- 2.3.Parentheticalism and Hypothetical Imperatives -- 2.4."Want" and Practical Reasoning -- 3.Parentheticalism and Normative Reasons -- 3.1.Normative Reasons and Psychological Specifications -- 3.2.Contextualism about "Ought" and "Reason(s)" -- 3.3.The Role of Parenthetical Statements in Reasons-Discourse in General -- 3.4.Parentheticalism and Psychological Views of Normative Reasons -- 4.Parentheticalism, Normative Reasons, and Error Cases -- 4.1.Gin, Gasoline, and Hotel Fires---The Problem of Error Cases -- 4.2.On the Ontology of Normative Reasons -- 4.3.Parentheticalism and Quasi-Factivity -- 4.4.Parentheticalism and a Unified Account of Normative Reasons -- 5.Parentheticalism and Requirements of Rationality -- 5.1.Parentheticalism and a Reductive Account of Rationality -- 5.2.Structural Rationality, Reasons, and the Bootstrapping Problem -- 5.3.Parentheticalism and the Myth of Structural Requirements of Rationality -- 5.4.Parentheticalism and Trying on the Agent's Point of View -- 5.5.Pseudo-Detachment and Reasoning from a Point of View -- 5.6.Conclusion -- 6.Parentheticalism and Action Explanation -- 6.1.How Do We Explain Actions in Terms of the Agent's Reasons? -- 6.2.Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism -- 6.3.Psychologism and the Intentio Obliqua Problem -- 6.4.Anti-Psychologism and the Factivity Problem -- 6.5.Parentheticalism, Motivating Reasons, and Quasi-Factivity -- 6.6.A Further Problem for Anti-Psychologism, and More Support for Parentheticalism -- 6.7.Action Explanation and Parenthetical "Want"-Statements -- 6.8.Where Parenthetical Explanantia Give Out -- 7.Parentheticalism and (Ir)rational Agency -- 7.1.The Problem of Akrasia -- 7.2.Akrasia, the Paradox of Self-Control, and Two Kinds of "Want"-Statements -- 7.3.Epistemic Akrasia and Parentheticalism about "Believe" -- 7.4.Two Aspects of Agency and the Rationale behind Parentheticalism -- 7.5.The Problem of the Missing Agent -- 7.6.The Agent as Author: Frankfurt, Bratman, Velleman, and Korsgaard -- 7.7.Parentheticalism and the Agent as Author.
- Summary
- Tim Henning applies insights from the philosophy of language and formal semantics to problems in practical philosophy, and solves notorious puzzles about the reasons we have, what it is rational for us to do, and what we ought to do. He offers a more unified understanding of normative and practical discourse.
- Subject(s)
- ISBN
- 9780191860850 (ebook)
- Audience Notes
- Specialized.
- Note
- This edition previously issued in print: 2018.
- Bibliography Note
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
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