Aristotle on the sources of the ethical life / Sylvia Berryman
- Berryman, Sylvia
- Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2019.
- First edition.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource
- Oxford Aristotle studies
Oxford scholarship online
- Machine generated contents note: 1.Introduction -- 2.Aristotle in the Ethic Wars -- The Uses of History -- Refinements and Responses -- Some Take-Home Lessons, and Two Research Questions -- 3.Nature and the Sources of Normativity -- The Complacency Charge -- Metaethics in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries bce -- ... And Plato, of Course -- The Explanatory Hypothesis and the Natural Good -- Does the Natural Good Extend beyond Species Development? -- 4.Is Aristotle an Archimedean Naturalist? -- An Embarrassment of Riches: The Ethical Treatises -- The Place of Ethics within the Hierarchy of Sciences -- The Human Ergon -- The Developmental Story -- Natural Virtues, Natural Justice -- 5.Naturalism in Aristotle's Politics -- The Politics and Aristotelian Natural Philosophy -- Evidence for a Naturalist Reading: Hierarchies -- Evidence for a Naturalist Reading: The Polis -- Aristotle as a Social Scientist -- 6.The Case against a Naturalist Reading -- The Non-Instrumental Value of the Virtues -- The Missing Blueprint and the Non-Deductive Nature of Practical Reason -- `No Deliberation About Ends' -- Aristotle and Contemporary Particularism -- The Story So Far -- 7.Aristotle's Metaethics -- The Rejection of Metaphysical Abstractions -- Human Agency as the Source of Normativity: Eudemian Ethics 2.6 -- The Primacy of Action -- The `Guise of the Good' -- The Formal Reading -- 8.The Practical Good -- Two Kinds of Value -- Bootstrapping as an Argument Form -- Socratic Bootstrapping -- Finding the Phronimos -- Conclusion.
- 'Aristotle on the Sources of the Ethical Life' challenges the common belief that Aristotle's ethics is founded on an appeal to human nature, an appeal that is thought to be intended to provide both substantive ethical advice and justification for the demands of ethics. Sylvia Berryman argues that this is not Aristotle's intent, while resisting the view that Aristotle was blind to questions of the source or justification of his ethical views. She interprets Aristotle's views as a 'middle way' between the metaphysical grounding offered by Platonists, and the scepticism or subjectivist alternatives articulated by others. The commitments implicit in the nature of action figure prominently in this account: Aristotle reinterprets Socrates' famous paradox that no-one does evil willingly, taking it to mean that a commitment to pursuing the good is implicit in the very nature of action.
- 9780191876561 (ebook)
- Audience Notes:
- This edition previously issued in print: 2019.
- Bibliography Note:
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
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