Planning to fail : the US wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan / James H. Lebovic

Author: Lebovic, James H.
Published: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2019.
Physical Description: 1 online resource

Access Online

Oxford scholarship online: ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu

Availability

Finding items...

Series

Contents

Machine generated contents note: 1.The US Wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan -- 2.The Vietnam War, 1965--1973 -- 3.The Iraq War, 2003--2011 -- 4.The Afghanistan War, 2001--? -- 5.Three Long and Costly Wars: What Can We Learn?.

Summary

The US wars in Vietnam (1965-1973), Iraq (2003-2011), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and common decisional failings. Despite its planning, the US failed to meet its early objectives in every one of these conflicts. A profound myopia at four stages of intervention helps explain why the US fought; chose to increase, decrease, or end its involvement in the conflicts; encountered a progressively reduced set of options; and settled for suboptimal results. US leaders were effectively planning to fail, whatever their hopes and thoughts at the time. American decision makers struggled less than they should have when conditions permitted good choices, and then struggled more than could matter when conditions left them with only bad choices.

Subject(s)

ISBN

9780190937263 (ebook)

Audience Notes

Specialized.

Note

Previously issued in print: 2019.

Bibliography Note

Includes bibliographical references and index.

View MARC record | catkey: 28940015