- Restrictions on Access:
- Open Access.
- This paper examines the effect of peer information on managerial myopia. If greater peer information is beneficial, investors will face less uncertainty about the firms own prospects and thus fixate less on current earnings. As a result, managers can face less pressure to focus on boosting short-term performance to signal high firm type. Using the percentage of public firms in the industry (i.e. public firm presence) as a measure of peer information, I find that managers in industries with greater public firm presence are less myopic. This effect of peer information reducing myopia is less pronounced in instances in which the manager is more pressured to meet short-term benchmarks, as measured by analyst coverage and transient ownership. Finally, I find that, for firms with greater public firm presence, investors face less information asymmetry and react less negatively when those firms miss an earnings benchmark, consistent with greater levels of peer information reducing myopia by facilitating investors to assess the firm more effectively.
- Dissertation Note:
- Ph.D. Pennsylvania State University 2019.
- Technical Details:
- The full text of the dissertation is available as an Adobe Acrobat .pdf file ; Adobe Acrobat Reader required to view the file.
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