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Choosing for changing selves / Richard Pettigrew

Author
Pettigrew, Richard
Published
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2020.
Edition
First edition.
Physical Description
1 online resource : illustrations (black and white).
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Contents
Machine generated contents note: pt. I AGGREGATING SELVES -- 1.The problem of choosing for changing selves -- 2.The economists' orthodoxy: expected utility theory -- 2.1.Expected utility theory: an example -- 2.2.Expected utility theory: the general case -- 2.3.Interpreting expected utility theory -- 2.4.Alternative decision theories -- 2.5.Expected utility theory and the problem of choosing for changing selves -- 3.Existing solutions I: the Unchanging Utility Solution -- 4.Existing solutions II: the Utility of Utility Solution -- 5.Existing solutions III: the One True Utility Solution -- 5.1.The Reflection Principle -- 5.2.The Weak Reflection Principle -- 5.3.Permissivism and learning from others -- 5.4.The objectivist's version of our problem -- 5.5.The implausible strength of objectivism -- 5.6.Appendix: Proof of Theorem 5.1.1 -- 6.The Aggregate Utility Solution I: which attitudes to aggregate? -- 6.1.Aggregating preferences -- 6.2.Aggregating evaluation functions -- 6.3.Aggregating credences and utilities -- 7.The Aggregate Utility Solution II: the solution itself -- 7.1.The framework -- 7.2.The decision rule -- 7.3.The instability of preferences -- 7.4.Responding to instability -- 8.Can we compare the utilities of different selves? -- 8.1.Representing values with numbers -- 8.2.Empathetic preferences -- 8.3.The Zero-One Rule -- 8.4.The Fixed Points Solution -- 8.5.The Fixed Interval Solution -- 8.6.The Matching Intervals Solution -- 9.Why aggregate using weighted averages? -- 9.1.The argument for linear pooling -- 9.1.1.The Principle of Minimal Mutilation -- 9.1.2.The dominance argument for weighted averages -- 9.2.The features of linear pooling -- 9.2.1.Arrow's conditions -- 9.2.2.Aggregating credences I: Independence Preservation -- 9.2.3.Aggregating credences II: commuting with conditionalization -- 9.2.4.Aggregating credences III: Independence Preservation revisited -- 9.3.Appendix: Proofs of Theorems 9.2.1 and 9.2.3 -- 9.3.1.Proof of Theorem 9.2.3 -- 10.Do we know enough to make decisions this way? -- 10.1.The deliberative conception of decision theory -- 10.2.Paul's Utility Ignorance Objection -- 10.3.Paul's Revelation Response -- 10.4.The Fine-Graining Response -- 10.5.Paul's Authenticity Reply -- 10.6.Moss's No Knowledge Reply -- 10.7.Assessing Moss's No Knowledge Reply: the Paulian view -- 10.8.Assessing Moss's No Knowledge Reply: the independent view -- pt. II SETTING THE WEIGHTS -- 11.The problem of weighting changing selves -- 12.The weight of the past -- 12.1.Deathbed decisions -- 12.2.Past values and permissibility -- 12.3.Past values and obligations -- 12.3.1.Three related principles -- 12.3.2.The libertarian objection -- 12.3.3.Exchange rates -- 12.3.4.Moral blackmail -- 12.3.5.Applying the Beneficiary Principle -- 12.3.6.Obligations and reparations -- 12.3.7.The intrapersonal version of the Beneficiary Principle -- 13.Discounting the future -- 13.1.The epistemic defence of temporal discounting -- 13.2.Parfit's defence of temporal discounting -- 13.3.A formal framework for temporal discounting -- 13.4.Constraints on discounting functions -- 13.5.Ahmed's objection to Parfit -- 13.6.Amending Ahmed's objection -- 13.7.Exploitability does not imply irrationality -- 13.7.1.Time Consistency and Unexploitability -- 13.7.2.Changing preferences and changing selves -- 13.7.3.Equal weightings -- 13.7.4.On the alleged badness of exploitability -- 13.8.Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas 13.4.1, 13.4.2, and 13.4.3 -- 14.The nearer the dearer -- 14.1.The Stoic Objection -- 14.2.Proximity considerations -- 14.3.Aneri's career -- 14.4.Fernando's pension -- 14.5.The Problem of Choosing for Changing Weights -- 15.I'll be glad I did it--so, I'll do it -- 15.1.What is Til be glad I did it'reasoning? -- 15.2.Two problems with the reasoning -- 15.3.Deborah's choice -- 15.4.Self-frustrating choices -- 16.The road ahead -- 16.1.The Aggregate Utility Solution summarized -- 16.2.Questions for future selves -- 16.2.1.Sensitivity to risk -- 16.2.2.Imprecise credences and imprecise utilities.
Summary
What we value, like, endorse, want, and prefer changes over the course of our lives. Richard Pettigrew presents a theory of rational decision making for agents who recognise that their values will change over time and whose decisions will affect those future times.
Subject(s)
ISBN
9780191852800 (ebook)
Audience Notes
Specialized.
Note
This edition previously issued in print: 2019.
Bibliography Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
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