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Local public good provision : voting, peer effects, and mobility / Stephen Calabrese [and others].

Published
Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, [2005]
Copyright Date
©2005
Physical Description
55 pages : illustrations ; 22 cm.
Additional Creators
Calabrese, Stephen and National Bureau of Economic Research
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Summary
"Few empirical strategies have been developed that investigate public provision under majority rule while taking explicit account of the constraints implied by mobility of households. The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of voting in local communities when neighborhood quality depends on peer or neighborhood effects. We develop a new empirical approach which allows us to impose all restrictions that arise from locational equilibrium models with myopic voting simultaneously on the data generating process. We can then analyze how close myopic models come in replicating the main regularities about expenditures, taxes, sorting by income and housing observed in the data. We find that a myopic voting model that incorporates peer effects fits all dimensions of the data reasonably well"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Subject(s)
Note
"October 2005."
Bibliography Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 45-48).
Other Forms
Also available in PDF from the NBER world wide web site (www.nber.org).
View MARC record | catkey: 3022832