Actions for Market Information and Signaling in Central Bank Operations, or, How Often Should a Central Bank Intervene? [electronic resource]

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Market Information and Signaling in Central Bank Operations, or, How Often Should a Central Bank Intervene? [electronic resource]

Corporate Author
International Monetary Fund
Published
Washington : International Monetary Fund March 1997
Physical Description
19 p.
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Summary
Annotation A central bank must decide on the frequency with which it will conduct open market operations and the variability in short-term money market that it will allow. It is shown how the optimal operating procedure balances the value of attaining an immediate target and broadcasting the central banks intentions against the informational advantages to the central bank of allowing the free play of market forces to reveal more of the information available to market participants.
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ISBN
9781451844627
145184462X (Trade Paper)
View MARC record | catkey: 31855678