Actions for Hamilton's paradox : the promise and peril of fiscal federalism

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Hamilton's paradox : the promise and peril of fiscal federalism / Jonathan A. Rodden

Author
Rodden, Jonathan
Published
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Physical Description
1 online resource (xvi, 313 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).
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Contents
Introduction and overview -- Promise and peril : intellectual history -- Sovereignty and commitment -- The power of the purse : intergovernmental grants and fiscal discipline -- Disease or cure? : political parties and fiscal discipline -- An approach to comparative case studies -- Fiscal federalism and bailouts in postwar Germany -- The crisis of fiscal federalism in Brazil -- The challenge of reform in federations -- The origins of subnational sovereignty -- Conclusions.
Summary
As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.
Subject(s)
ISBN
9780511616075 (ebook)
9780521842693 (hardback)
9780521603669 (paperback)
Note
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
View MARC record | catkey: 34833905