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Democracy and coercive diplomacy / Kenneth A. Schultz

Author
Schultz, Kenneth A.
Additional Titles
Democracy & Coercive Diplomacy
Published
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Physical Description
1 online resource (xv, 301 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).
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Series
Contents
1. Introduction -- Pt. I. Theory -- 2. Information and signaling in international crises -- 3. Democratic politics in international crises -- 4. Domestic competition and signaling in international crises -- Pt. II. Empirical analysis -- 5. Selective threats, effective threats: the initiation and escalation of international crises -- 6. Credibility confirmed: the implications of domestic support -- 7. Credibility undermined: the implications of domestic dissent -- 8. Conclusions and implications -- App. A. Solution to the basic crisis bargaining game -- App. B. Solution to the bargaining game with opposition -- App. C. Data and methods -- App. D. Coding and sources for opposition stances.
Summary
In this book, first published in 2001, Kenneth Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on the use and success of coercive diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between the government and opposition parties influences the decision to use threats in international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and whether or not crises can be settled short of war. The relative transparency of their political processes means that, while democratic governments cannot easily conceal domestic constraints against using force, they can also credibly demonstrate resolve when their threats enjoy strong domestic support. As a result, compared to their non-democratic counterparts, democracies are more selective about making threats, but those they do make are more likely to be successful - that is, to gain a favorable outcome without resort to war. Schultz develops his argument through a series of game-theoretic models and tests the resulting hypothesis using both statistical analyses and historical case studies.
Subject(s)
ISBN
9780511491658 (ebook)
9780521792271 (hardback)
9780521796699 (paperback)
Note
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
View MARC record | catkey: 34837468