The plaintiff, McKay, sold a slave boy to the defendant, Simpson, for [dollars] 150 and three shares in the Bank of Cape Fear. The bill of sale contained a warranty of the slave's soundness qualified by the statement that he suffered from a small rupture. Following the sale, McKay discovered that the bank would not recognise him as the new owner of the shares, and thus qualified to be paid dividends, without a legal transfer from Simpson. McKay therefore filed this bill to enjoin Simpson to make the transfer. Simpson refused on the grounds of fraud in the bill of sale; he claimed the clause about the rupture was inserted secretly by the defendant and that the rupture was anyway a large one that lessened the slave's value. The Supreme Court ruled that equity allowed the correction of mistakes in conveyances of property to make them conform with the intentions of the parties and that Simpson could not use the rupture as a pretext to refuse to transfer title in the shares; this would be a summary mode of redress, inconsistent with the course of this Court in the administration of justice. Verdict for the plaintiff.
