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Body, mind and self in Hume's critical realism / Fred Wilson

Author
Wilson, Fred, 1937-
Published
Frankfurt : Ontos Verlag, 2008.
Physical Description
1 online resource (539 pages).
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Contents
Acknowledgments; Note; Table of Contents; Introduction; Chapter OneSelf as Substance; (1) The Substance Tradition1; (2) The Metaphysics of Morals; (3) Morality and the Substantial Self Untied; (4) Human Nature Defended; (5) George Grant: Aristotelian Moral Philosophy Made Modern; (6) Another Sort of Mind; (7) Minds as Bundles; Endnotes to Chapter One; Chapter TwoNominalism and Acquaintance; (1) Individuation and Nominalism; (2) The Principle of Acquaintance in Locke and Hume; (3) The Appeal to Acquaintance: Empiricism vs. Descartes; (4) Hume's Nominalism; (5) Nominalism and Relations., (6) Nominalism, Causation, Substances and ThingsEndnotes to Chapter Two; Chapter ThreeFrom the Substance Tradition through Locketo Hume:Ordinary Things and Critical Realism; (1) Up to Locke; (2) From Locke to Hume9; (3) Hume's Causal Inference to Critical Realism; (4) The System of the Vulgar as False, Inevitable and Reasonable; (5) The World of the Philosophers; (6) Conclusion; Endnotes to Chapter Three; The Disappearance of the Simple Self: ItsProblems; (1) Substance and Self in Locke1; (2) The Contents of the Humean Mind; (3) Explaining Consciousness; (4) Privacy and Other Minds., and (5) The Problem of the Self in HumeEndnotes to Chapter Four; Chapter FiveHume's Positive Account of the Self; (1) Mind and Body; (2) The Bodily Criterion; (3) Humean Persons; (4) Becoming Our Selves; (5) Conclusion -- The Final One; Endnotes to Chapter Five; Bibliography.
Summary
This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pr.
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ISBN
9783110327076 (e-book)
3110327074 (e-book)
3938793791
9783938793794
311032668X
9783110326680
Bibliography Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
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