""Contents""; ""Introduction""; ""PART I. PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES PROVIDE REASONS""; ""1 Historical�Epistemological Context""; ""2 Belief and Experience""; ""2.1 Preliminaries""; ""2.2 The Strawson Argument""; ""2.3 Refinements""; ""3 Experience and Reason""; ""3.1 The Switching Argument""; ""3.2 Knowledge by Description""; ""3.3 Conceptual Redeployment""; ""3.4 Natural Kinds and Proper Names""; ""3.5 Are There Unitary Concepts of Mind-Independent Things?""; ""4 Epistemological Consequences and Criticisms""; ""4.1 Reliabilism""; ""4.2 Classical Foundationalism"", 4.3 Classical Coherentism4.4 Conclusion -- PART II. THE RATIONAL ROLE OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES -- 5 Reasons Require Conceptual Contents -- 5.1 The Basic Argument -- 5.2 Possible Counterexamples -- 5.3 Non-Conceptual Experiential Content Is Unmotivated -- 6 The Rational Role of Perceptual Experiences -- 6.1 Objective Demonstratives -- 6.2 Epistemic Openness -- 6.3 Clarifications -- 7 The Epistemological Outlook -- 7.1 Foundationalism and Coherentism -- 7.2 Imagination -- 7.3 Error and Scepticism -- 7.4 Further Objections -- 8 Developments and Consequences, and 8.1 Non-Demonstrative Perceptual Knowledge8.2 Russell's Principle of Acquaintance -- 8.3 Externalism and A Priori Knowledge -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W
Summary
This volume presents an original view of the role of conscious experience in the acquisition of knowledge. It argues that experiences must provide reasons for beliefs if there are to be any beliefs about the mind-independent world at all.
