Cover; Title; Copyright; Contents; Outline of the Chapters; Preface; Acknowledgments; Chapter One: The Image of Self- Knowledge; 1.1 The Fortunes of Self-Consciousness: Descartes, Freud, and Cognitive Science; 1.2 The Possibility of Self-Knowledge: Introspection, Perception, and Deflation; 1.3 Constitutive Relations and Detection; 1.4 "Conscious Belief": Locating the First-Person; Chapter Two: Making Up Your Mind: Self-Interpretation and Self-Constitution; 2.1 Self-Interpretation, Objectivity, and Independence; 2.2 Self-Fulfillment and Its Discontents; 2.3 The Whole Person's Discrete States., 2.4 Belief and the Activity of Interpreting2.5 The Process of Self-Creation: Theoretical and Deliberative Questions; 2.6 Relations of Transparency; Chapter Three: Self-Knowledge as Discovery and as Resolution; 3.1 Wittgenstein and Moore's Paradox; 3.2 Sartre, Self-Consciousness, and the Limits of the Empirical; 3.3 Avowal and Attribution; 3.4 Binding and Unbinding; Chapter Four: The Authority of Self- Consciousness; 4.1 Expressing, Reporting, and Avowing; 4.2 Rationality, Awareness, and Control: A Look Inside; 4.3 From Supervision to Authority: Agency and the Attitudes., 4.4 The Retreat to Evidence4.5 First-Person Immediacy and Authority; 4.6 Introspection and the Deliberative Point of View; 4.7 Reflection and the Demands of Authority: Apprehension, Arrest, and Conviction; 4.8 The Reflective Agent; Chapter Five: Impersonality, Expression, and the Undoing of Self-Knowledge; 5.1 Self-Other Asymmetries and Their Skeptical Interpretation; 5.2 The Partiality of the Impersonal Stance; 5.3 Self-Effacement and Third-Person Privilege; 5.4 Paradoxes of Self-Censure; 5.5 Incorporation and the Expressive Reading; 5.6 "Not First-Personal Enough?"; Bibliography; Index; A., and Bc; d; e; f; g; h; j; k; l; m; n; p; r; s; t; v; w.
Summary
Since Socrates, and through Descartes to the present day, the problems of self-knowledge have been central to philosophy's understanding of itself. Today the idea of ''first-person authority''--the claim of a distinctive relation each person has toward his or her own mental life--has been challenged from a number of directions, to the point where many doubt the person bears any distinctive relation to his or her own mental life, let alone a privileged one. In Authority and Estrangement, Richard Moran argues for a reconception of the first-person and its claims. Indeed, he writes, a more thorou.
