Pragmatism and epistemology : deconstruction or reconstruction? -- The decline and fall of correspondence -- Keeping reality in mind : the comparison objection -- Neither worldmakers nor mirrors : the constructivist objection -- Towards a pragmatist epistemology -- Rorty's brave new pragmatism -- Anti-foundationalism : from the ground up -- Anti-representationalism and its discontents.
Summary
For much of the twentieth century, many Anglo-American philosophers supported three theses - one about reality, one about truth, and one about human knowledge - that, taken together, underwrote debates in epistemology. The first was realism: the commonsensical-sounding view that the world of physical objects exists independently of human thought or language. The second was the correspondence theory of truth, according to which true statements or beliefs are those which accurately represent the way the world is. The third was foundationalism: the view that our knowledge of the world, like an ed.