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Optimal provision of multiple excludable public goods / Hanming Fang, Peter Norman

Author
Fang, Hanming
Published
Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, [2008]
Copyright Date
©2008
Physical Description
45, 7 pages : illustrations ; 22 cm.
Additional Creators
Norman, Peter, 1966- and National Bureau of Economic Research
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Summary
This paper studies the optimal provision mechanism for multiple excludable public goods when agents' valuations are private information. For a parametric class of problems with binary valuations, we demonstrate that the optimal mechanism involves bundling if a regularity condition, akin to a hazard rate condition, on the distribution of valuations is satisfied. Bundling alleviates the free riding problem in large economies in two ways: first, it may increase the asymptotic provision probability of socially efficient public goods from zero to one; second, it decreases the extent of use exclusions. If the regularity condition is violated, then the optimal solution replicates the separate provision outcome.
Subject(s)
Note
"February 2008."
Bibliography Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 22-24).
Other Forms
Also available in PDF from the NBER World Wide Web site (www.nber.org).
View MARC record | catkey: 4358320