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Ambiguity and extremism in elections / Alberto F. Alesina, Richard T. Holden

Author
Alesina, Alberto
Published
Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, [2008]
Copyright Date
©2008
Physical Description
27 pages : illustrations ; 22 cm.
Additional Creators
Holden, Richard T., 1974- and National Bureau of Economic Research
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Summary
We analyze a model in which voters are uncertain about the policy preferences of candidates. Two forces affect the probability of electoral success: proximity to the median voter and campaign contributions. First, we show how campaign contributions affect elections. Then we show how the candidates may wish to announce a range of policy preferences, rather than a single point. This strategic ambiguity balances voter beliefs about the appeal of candidates both to the median voter and to the campaign contributors. If primaries precede a general election, they add another incentive for ambiguity, because in the primaries the candidates do not want to reveal too much information, to maintain some freedom of movement in the policy space for the general election. Ambiguity has an option value.
Subject(s)
Note
"June 2008."
Bibliography Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 22-24).
Other Forms
Also available in PDF from the NBER World Wide Web site (www.nber.org).
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