Identifying exclusionary abuses by dominant undertakings under EU competition law : the spectrum of tests / Eirik Østerud
- Østerud, Eirik
- Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands : Kluwer Law International, 
Frederick, MD : Sold and distributed in North, Central and South America by Aspen Publishers.
- Copyright Date:
- Physical Description:
- xii, 350 pages ; 25 cm.
- International competition law series, v. 45
- Machine generated contents note: ch. 1 Introduction -- 1.1.Subject and Purpose -- 1.2.Scope and Materials -- 1.3.Outline -- ch. 2 Designing a Legal Framework to Distinguish Lawful from Unlawful Exclusionary Conduct: Challenges and Approaches -- ch. 3 Identifying Exclusionary Abuses Under Article 102 TFEU: Objectives, General Concepts and the Development of a Spectrum of Conduct-Specific Tests -- 3.1.Introduction -- 3.2.The Objectives -- 3.3.The General Concepts -- 3.3.1.Introduction -- 3.3.2.Dominant Firms' Special Reponsibility Not to Distort Competition -- 3.3.3.The Basic Definition of Exclusionary Abuse -- 3.4.Operationalizing the Assessment of Exclusionary Conduct -- 3.4.1.Introduction -- 3.4.2.The Spectrum of Conduct-Specific Tests -- 3.4.3.Objectives Justification -- ch. 4 Form-Based Tests -- 4.1.Introduction -- 4.2.General Characteristics and Different Types of Form-Based Tests -- 4.3.Tests That Condemn Practices Limiting the Customers' Choice of Supplier -- 4.3.1.Introduction -- 4.3.2.Exclusivity Agreements -- 4.3.3.Loyalty Rebates -- 4.3.4.Refusals to Supply That Induce Exclusivity -- 4.3.5.Tying -- 4.3.6.Comment -- 4.4.Tests That Condemn Pricing Practices Based on Price-Cost Comparisons -- 4.4.1.Introduction -- 4.4.2.Predatory Pricing (below AVC) -- 4.4.3.Margin Squeeze -- 4.4.4.Comment -- 4.5.A Test That Condemns Discrimination Placing a Trading Party at a Competitive Disadvantage: Secondary Line Price Discrimination under Article 102(c) TFEU -- 4.6.Concluding Remarks -- ch. 5 Intent-Based Tests -- 5.1.Introduction -- 5.2.The Design of Tests That Require Exclusionary Intention -- 5.3.Practices That Are Abusive If the Dominant Firm's Intention Is Exclusionary -- 5.3.1.Introduction -- 5.3.2.Predatory Pricing (between ATC and AVC) -- 5.3.3.Vexatious Litigation -- 5.4.The Concept of Exclusionary Intention -- 5.5.Proving Exclusionary Intention -- 5.6.Unsuccessful Attempts to Exclude Competitors from the Market -- 5.7.Intent in the Application of Other Tests -- 5.8.Concluding Remarks -- ch. 6 Effect-Based Tests 1 Harm to Competition -- 6.1.Introduction -- 6.2.The Design of Tests That Require the Effect of Restricting Competition -- 6.3.Practices That Are Abusive If Their Effect Is Restrictive of Competition -- 6.3.1.Introduction -- 6.3.2.Acquisitions of Intellectual Property Rights -- 6.3.3.Selective Above-Cost Price Cuts -- 6.3.4.Indirect Exclusivity Agreements -- 6.3.5.Refusals to Supply Indispensable Physical Property -- 6.3.6.Technological Integration -- 6.3.7.Comment -- 6.4.The Meaning of Harm to Competition -- 6.5.The Standard of Significance -- 6.6.Actual and Probable Harm to Competition -- 6.6.1.Introduction -- 6.6.2.Is It Necessary to Demonstrate Actual Effects? -- 6.6.3.The Required Level of Probability of Harm to Competition -- 6.7.Concluding Remarks -- ch. 7 Effect-Based Tests 2 Additional Harm to Consumers (Refusals to License IPRs) -- 7.1.Introduction -- 7.2.The Design of the Test Applicable to Refusals to License IPRs -- 7.3.Preventing Innovation to the Prejudice of Consumers -- 7.3.1.Introduction -- 7.3.2.The Development of the `New Product Criterion' -- 7.3.3.The Rationale behind the Criterion -- 7.3.4.The Substantive Test: Article 102(b) TFEU -- 7.4.Indispendability/Harm to Competition -- 7.5.Concluding Remarks -- ch. 8 The Concept of Objective Justification -- 8.1.Introduction -- 8.2.The Concept in Brief -- 8.3.Valid Justifications -- 8.3.1.Introduction -- 8.3.2.Protection of Commercial Interests -- 8.3.3.Technical or Commercial Constraints -- 8.3.4.Efficiencies -- 8.3.5.Public Interests -- 8.3.6.Comment -- 8.4.Proportionality -- 8.4.1.Introduction -- 8.4.2.Appropriateness/Suitability -- 8.4.3.Necessity/Indispensability -- 8.4.4.Proportionality Stricto Sensu -- 8.4.5.No Elimination of Competition? -- 8.5.Cost Justifications for Rebate Systems -- 8.5.1.Introduction -- 8.5.2.Rebates That Reflect Cost Savings Or Payments for Services Rendered Are Considered Objectively Justified -- 8.5.3.The Development of An Efficiency Defence for Rebates -- 8.6.Concluding Remarks -- ch. 9 The Spectrum of Tests: Implications -- 9.1.Introduction -- 9.2.The Benefits of Conduct-Specific Tests -- 9.3.Categorization of Conduct May Affect the Outcome of a Case -- 9.4.Disputes Over Categorization -- 9.5.Category Evasion/Category Shopping -- 9.6.Changes in Scope and Criteria of Conduct-Specific Tests -- 9.7.The Treatment of New Forms of Potential Abuses -- 9.8.Consistency -- ch. 10 Final Remarks.
- Under Article 102 TFEU, dominant firms are allowed to compete, but only to the extent their market behaviour does not constitute an abuse. Needless to say, the wording of the article neither explains what an abusive restriction of competition is nor how such a practice can be identified. Rather than developing a one-size-fits-all test applicable to all forms of market behaviour by dominant firms, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the General Court (ex Court of First Instance) have set out a system of tests for separate categories of conduct. Drawing on the full range of the EU Courts' relevant case law, this very useful book anlayses the conditions that must be fulfilled for a broad range of business practices to be deemed abusive within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, and also identifies the criteria that must be fulfilled for a practice to be `objectively justified.` --
The author also contrasts the Commission's decisional practice with the case law, assesses approaches under U.S. antitrust law to similar forms of conduct, and incorporates insights from economic theory. --
This study greatly enhances our understanding of the distinction between abusive conduct and lawful competition. In the course of its clarification of the EU Courts' responses to individual forms of market behaviour, an overall approach to the identification of exclusionary abuses under Article 102 TFEU begins to come into view. Apart from the important new synthesis the work offers legal scholars, there can be little coubt this book will prove a valuable asset and even an inspiration to competition lawyers. --Book Jacket.
- 9789041132710 (hardcover : acid-free paper)
9041132716 (hardcover : acid-free paper)
- Based on the author's thesis (doctoral)--University of Oslo, 2009.
- Bibliography Note:
- Includes bibliographical references (pages -346) and index.
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